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THE HEALTH CARE MALPRACTICE CLAIMS STATUTE:
MARYLAND'S RESPONSE TO THE
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CRISIS
Kevin G. Quinnt
Since the Maryland General Assembly adopted the Health
Care Malpractice Claims Statute, that law has come under
repeated attack in the courts and in legal and medical
circles. This article traces the social backdrop against which
the Assembly promulgated the statute and outlines the pro-
visions of the new claims procedure. After describing the
challenges the statute has already overcome, the author dis-
cusses the effectiveness of the procedure for resolving mal-
practice claims against health care providers in Maryland
In recent years, the skyrocketing cost of medical malpractice
insurance has generated great concern within the insurance industry
and the legal and medical professions over the efficacy of procedures
used in resolving malpractice claims. The traditional tort system,
many believe, has developed so many shortcomings that it no longer
provides a fair or efficient basis for the resolution of such claims. Its
inadequacies are claimed to be the major cause of the high volume of
malpractice litigation and the high amounts of damage awards and
settlements. In turn, the high incidence and cost of medical malprac-
tice litigation have been accused not only of causing considerable dis-
ruption to the malpractice insurance industry, but also of under-
mining the effective delivery of health care services to the public.
State legislatures throughout the nation have been responding
to the so-called "medical malpractice crisis" in a variety of ways.
Many, among those the Maryland General Assembly, have estab-
lished non-judicial frameworks for the resolution of malpractice
claims in the form of medical review panels, screening panels, or arbi-
tration procedures. In an attempt to eliminate what it perceived to
be some of the major disadvantages of the traditional claims resolu-
tion process, the Maryland legislature adopted the Health Care Mal-
practice Claims Statute in 1976.1 This statute requires that medical
malpractice litigants attempt to resolve their disputes by submitting
them to an arbitration panel before resorting to court action.
Since its adoption over four years ago, Maryland's arbitration
f A.B., 1976, Loyola College of Maryland; M.B.A., 1979, University of Maryland; J.D.,
1979, University of Maryland School of Law; Associate, Miles & Stockbridge, Baltimore,
Maryland; Member, Maryland Bar.
1. Law of May 4, 1976, ch. 235, 1976 Md. Laws 496 (codified at MD. 0Ts. & JUD. PROC. CODE
ANN. §§ 3-2A-01 to -09 (1980)).
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process has been hampered by litigation attacking its constitution-
ality, 2 an unexpectedly high volume of malpractice claims, inade-
quate funding and administrative assistance, and lack of support
from both the medical and legal professions. 3 For these reasons, the
controversy over the legislative efforts in Maryland to respond to
the crisis in medical malpractice claims resolution continues. This
article examines: (1) the causes and effects of the medical malpractice
crisis; (2) how some state legislatures, particularly Maryland's, have
attempted to remedy the problem; (3) why many advocate preserv-
ing the traditional tort system; and (4) the salient points and prac-
tical ramifications of the arbitration system now in effect in
Maryland.
I. CRISIS OF MANY DIMENSIONS
In the area of medical costs, the effects of medical malpractice
suits have attracted a great deal of public attention. Exorbitant
premiums charged hospitals and physicians for malpractice insur-
ance have been assertedly driving upward the cost of health care. As
one analyst has observed, "Malpractice premium costs are passed on
in the form of increased health care prices, and thus also affect health
care insurance rates."' 4 Relevant statistics verify that a rising por-
tion of the already growing cost of medical care is attributable to
malpractice insurance, with premiums for some health care pro-
viders as much as doubling in any one year.5
In addition to the direct costs passed on to the consumer,
another dimension of the crisis is represented by certain indirect
costs which have not only an undesirable economic impact but
potentially far-reaching consequences on the overall delivery of med-
ical services. Doctors and other health care providers, fearful of suit
and consequent higher premium rates, apparently are practicing
defensive medicine more now than ever before.6 For instance, many
physicians order batteries of diagnostic tests and engage in a variety
of other procedures that may be medically unnecessary but serve to
forestall the possibility of lawsuits as well as to provide a good legal
defense in the event lawsuits are instituted. Moreover, some physi-
cians have become increasingly reluctant to undertake treatment
programs that entail a high degree of risk, even though such pro-
2. See, e.g., Attorney General v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 385 A.2d 57, appeal dismissed, 437
U.S. 117 (1978).
3. The Sun (Baltimore), Oct. 14, 1980, at D1, col 5.
4. Robeson, Medical Malpractice Insurance: An Economic View, Bus. HORIZONS, Apr. 1976,
at 75.
5. See, e.g., NAT'L UNDERWRITER, July 16, 1976, at 12-13 (Opinion-Editorial); NAT'L UNDER-
WRITER, Oct. 29, 1976, at 2 (Opinion-Editorial.
6. See Blant, The Medical Malpractice Crisis - Its Causes and Future, INS. COUNSEL J., Jan.
1977, at 114, 115.
19801
Baltimore Law Review
grams may be entirely appropriate and necessary for certain
patients.7 The estimated cost of such defensive medicine has ranged
from three to five billion dollars annually." The threat of malpractice
liability unquestionably has had a detrimental effect on the profes-
sional decision-making of medical practitioners and the overall
delivery of medical services.
A variety of factors figure into the recent growth in the number
of malpractice claims, amounts of awards, and cost of liability insur-
ance. These include a weakening of the doctor-patient relationship
resulting from growing medical specialization, a loss of trust and
confidence in the medical profession by consumers of health care, the
general problem of economic inflation,9 and perhaps an increasingly
litigious society.10 But no factor seems to have played more prom-
inent a role in the growth of the medical malpractice crisis than the
very system for the resolution of malpractice claims. The shortcom-
ings of the traditional tort system, such as multi-year delays in
claims resolution, the extensive and expensive use of pretrial
discovery procedures and medical experts, and the inevitably high
legal and administrative expenses, have contributed significantly to
the overall costs associated with medical malpractice litigation.
Worse, these costs have been consuming a greater portion of the
malpractice insurance premium dollar than that recovered by the
successful claimant.1 Court-created modifications of malpractice law
have expanded the group of persons entitled to recover damages and
have facilitated the claimant's ability to prove his case, thereby mak-
ing the traditional resolution process highly vulnerable to unmeritor-
ious claims.1 Not surprisingly, this situation and the resulting uncer-
tainty experienced by insurance company risk managers led first to
skyrocketing malpractice insurance premiums and then to an exodus
of insurers from the medical malpractice underwriting field.13
7. See, e.g., NAT'L UNDERWRITER, Oct. 29, 1976, at 2 (Opinion-Editorial).
8. See, e.g., NAT'L UNDERWRITER, Jan. 23, 1976, at 8 (Opinion-Editorial).
9. Abraham, Medical Malpractice Reform A Preliminary Analysis, 36 MD. L. REV. 489,490
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Abraham].
10. The President of the American Trial Lawyers Association argues, however, that, notwith-
standing the commonly cited causes of rising malpractice insurance, premiums charged to
health care providers are far out of line with past and projected insurance payments. See
Koskoff, President's Page, TRIAL, Dec. 1979, at 4.
11. See Abraham, supra note 9, at 491 n.9 and accompanying text.
12. One major medical malpractice liability insurer experienced a rise in frequency of claims of
139% between 1968 and 1974, with the overall amount paid to claimants in settlement or
by judgment rising 117% during the same period. See Abraham, supra note 9, at 490 n.3.
And yet, only about 16% of the malpractice suits actually brought to trial result in favor-
able verdicts for plaintiffs. 36 FAcTs ON FILE 1016 (1976) (citing J. of Coin., July 28, 1976).
13. See Comnient, The Constitutionality of Medical Malpractice Mediation Panels: A Mary-




In 1974, Maryland's medical practitioners felt the full impact of
growing claims and payouts on medical malpractice insurers. In the
fall of that year, St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company, Mary-
land's largest medical malpractice insurer, notified the some 3,600
physicians it insured that it would not renew their malpractice insur-
ance coverage on January 1, 1975.14 In an explanation accompanying
the notice, St. Paul summarized its unsuccessful efforts to offset ris-
ing losses and stated that it had incurred a deficit of almost ten mil-
lion dollars in the line of malpractice insurance in Maryland. The
Insurance Commissioner of Maryland issued an order to St. Paul
requiring it to continue providing coverage for Maryland physicians
at then applicable rates.15 The company challenged the order in the
Baltimore City Court, but the trial judge affirmed the directive of
the Insurance Commissioner. On appeal, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland reversed the decision of the trial court, ruling that St. Paul
could not be forced to continue writing malpractice insurance in
Maryland."
II. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO THE
MALPRACTICE DILEMMA
A. The 1975 Maryland General Assembly
The delay created by the litigation between the Insurance Com-
missioner and St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company provided
the Maryland legislature time to respond to the malpractice crisis
with legislation designed to assure continued insurance coverage for
Maryland medical practitioners. The General Assembly's most nota-
ble effort during the 1975 session was its institution of the Medical
Mutual Liability Insurance Society to provide insurance against pro-
fessional liability to physicians and indemnification of persons suc-
cessfully claiming damages in malpractice suits. 1 7 With special
assistance from the legislature by way of exemption from certain
insurance regulations and the levying of a special one-time tax of
$300 on Maryland's practicing physicians, 18 the Society was quickly
14. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Insurance Comm'r, 275 Md. 130, 133-34, 339 A.2d 291,
293 (1975).
15. Id at 135, 339 A.2d at 294.
16. Id at 132, 339 A.2d at 292.
17. Law of April 29, 1975, ch. 544, 1975 Md. Laws 2604 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A,
§§ 548-556 (1979)). As a mutual rather than proprietary insurance company, the Medical
Mutual Liability Insurance Society is wholly-owned and supported by the Maryland
physicians to whom it extends coverage. Significantly, the Society has become an enor-
mously profitable organization, having amassed more than $60 million in assets and pay-
ing out less than $1.4 million in claims as of April 1, 1980. The small payout in claims is
largely due to the backlog of malpractice claims awaiting arbitration. See Weiser, From
Crisis to Riches, Washington Post, April 2, 1980, § A, at 1, col 1.




able to fill the malpractice insurance void left by St. Paul.19 In addi-
tion, the General Assembly established the Maryland Professional
Liability Pool in order to make available malpractice coverage at
standard rates for doctors unable to obtain insurance in the regular
market. 0
In what now appears to be a piecemeal approach to mitigating
the effects of the malpractice problem in 1975, the legislature
explored, endorsed, and adopted several other provisions relating to
the quality of health care and the resolution of malpractice claims. In
response to extensive testimony offered by representatives of insur-
ance companies, the General Assembly shortened the statute of
limitations for bringing malpractice claims. Under the new statute of
limitations, a medical malpractice suit must be filed within five years
of the injury or within three years from discovery of the injury,
whichever time period is shorter.2 1 In an attempt to enhance the
effectiveness of peer review programs and Maryland's Commission
on Medical Discipline,22 the Assembly also passed a law protecting
the integrity and confidentiality of disclosure regarding the
qualifications, fitness, or character of physicians practicing in the
state.
2 3
Two other measures considered by the General Assembly were
aimed at more comprehensively restructuring the process of mal-
practice claims resolution. House Bill 829 proposed a Medical Injury
Compensation Commission 2 4 The Commission was designed to sup-
plant the courts as a forum for malpractice claims and to remedy
such alleged inadequacies of the traditional tort system as jury mis-
19. See Attorney General v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 280-81, 385 A.2d 57, 61, appeal dis-
missed, 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
20. Law of April 29, 1975, ch. 546, 1975 Md. Laws 2612 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A,
§§ 557-564 (1979)). The Liability Pool and the Medical Mutual Liability Insurance Soci-
ety are not mutually exclusive insurance operations. While the Society, by charter, must
write malpractice insurance for any doctor, the Liability Pool provides doctors an alter-
native market for insurance. General liability insurers can be required to participate in the
pool as a condition of doing business in the state. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 560 (1979).
To date, these two organizations remain the major insurers of medical practitioners in
Maryland.
21. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-109 (1980). It had been frequently argued that the
"long tail" of incurred but undiscovered claims made it impossible for insurance actuaries
to determine accurately the appropriate level of reserves. The uncertainty about the fre-
quency and severity of future malpractice judgments required the companies to set high
reserves and accordingly charge physicians much higher premiums. The longer the time
period in which a malpractice suit could be brought, the higher loss estimates and hence
insurance premiums had to be. By shortening the limitation period, insurers could set
rates more efficiently and physicians would realize cost savings through lower premiums.
22. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, §§ 130, 134A (1980).
23. Law of April 22, 1975, ch. 423, 1975 Md. Laws 2347 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, §
136C (1980)).
24. H.D. 829, 1975 Sess. § 2.
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understanding of complex medical testimony and the law of negli-
gence, jury emotionalism in awarding high damages particularly for
pain and suffering, and the long delay in claims resolution resulting
from crowded trial dockets and various dilatory tactics of
attorneys.25 The bill failed to pass but was reassigned for further con-
sideration and ultimately rewritten by the Assembly Committee on
Economic Matters. As amended, the proposed bill provided for man-
datory arbitration of all medical malpractice claims with only limited
judicial review of the determination of the arbitration panel The pro-
posed Reparations Act was adopted by the House of Delegates,2
6
despite an Attorney General's Opinion which concluded that the bill
unconstitutionally deprived a claimant of the right to trial by jury.
27
Relying on that same opinion, however, the State Senate defeated
the proposal.
It had become clear that the legislature realized that the creation
of new sources of malpractice insurance for the medical profession
eliminated only a symptom of the crisis at hand. The real cause of
the crisis was the traditional tort system, which failed to effect an
overall balance of advantage between plaintiffs and defendants. The
courts helped create this imbalance through the promulgation of
liberal discovery rules and through decisions affecting substantive
law. In Maryland, the "strict locality" rule had been rejected by the
court of appeals in favor of permitting plaintiffs to import from other
parts of the country expert witnesses,28 many of whom devote a
large portion of their careers to testifying on behalf of claimants in
malpractice cases. Further, the doctrine of informed consent had
been adopted.29 The factor that most dramatically undermined the
25. McGuirk & Rafferty, Medical Malpractice and the Maryland Legislature 6 MD. L.F. 9, 11
(1976).
26. Id
27. 60 Op. Md. Att'y Gen. 101 (1975). The Attorney General's Office asserted:
[W]e believe that House Bill 829 in the form presented to us violates the right to
a trial by jury as guaranteed by the Maryland Constitution. This might well not
be the case if the common law cause of action had been altered in some signifi-
cant way, if a broad regulatory scheme had been established or if de novo appeal
by a jury were provided.
Id at 114.
28. See Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 276 Md. 187, 349 A.2d 245 (1975).
Locality rules determine the standard for judging the health care practitioner's duty to
the patient. Under the strict locality rule, the practitioner's duty is that degree of care
generally exercised by practitioners in the same community or locality in which the
defendant practitioner works. Id at 188, 349 A.2d at 246. For a critical view of the strict
locality rule applied by Maryland courts before 1975, see Ellin, The Law of Medical Mal-
practice in Maryland- A Plaintiffs Dilemnra 3 U. BALT. L. REv. 207 (1974).
29. See Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. 432, 379 A.2d 1014 (1977). Under the doctrine of informed
consent, the treating physician must reveal to the patient all information regarding pro-
posed treatment necessary for the patient to make an intelligent decision as to whether to
consent to the treatment. Id at 438-45. 379 A.2d at 1019-23.
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efficiency and fairness of the traditional tort system appeared to be
jury emotionalism in determining liability and damages. In the
absence of remedial actions designed to correct this imbalance
within the tort system, it seemed probable that the number and
severity of damage awards and settlements would continue to grow.
B. Alternatives to the Traditional Tort System
By 1975, the search for viable alternatives to the traditional
process of resolving malpractice claims was being conducted by leg-
islatures throughout the country. Several dramatic alternatives to
the traditional process were discussed but never seriously enter-
tained by the legislatures. These included the employment of com-
missions similar in form and operation to Workmen's Compensation
Boards, the adoption of "no-fault" legislation, and the implementa-
tion of a system of first-party accident insurance which covers the
party injured as a result of malpractice.3 0 Few legislatures, however,
have appeared willing to abdicate the traditional fault system
entirely, preferring to modify it by adopting measures to shorten the
statute of limitations for malpractice suits, strike the use of ad
damnum clauses, abolish the collateral source rule, limit the amount
of recoveries and contingency fees, or increase the burden of proof by
abandoning the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
Legislatures intent on effecting a more extensive alteration of
their state's tort system have most frequently endorsed four varie-
ties of arbitration or pretrial screening programs: arbitration by
prior agreement between the parties, arbitration of an existing dis-
pute by present agreement, voluntary binding arbitration,31 and
compulsory non-binding pretrial screening. 32 Private arbitration by
prior or present agreement was used in certain areas of the country
long before the onset of the malpractice crisis.33 Since the early
1970's, however, voluntary binding arbitration and compulsory non-
binding screening panels have been the two most widely adopted
mechanisms for the resolution of malpractice disputes.14 In design-
30. See D. LouisLL & H. WiLIAMs, 1 MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 11.07 (1979).
31. See Ladimer & Solomon, Medical Malpractice Arbitration. Laws, Programs, Cases, 653
INS. L.J. 335 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Ladimer & Solomon]. For a list and description
of statutory provisions for voluntary binding arbitration of medical malpractice claims,
see id at 358-61 app. Puerto Rico has adopted a scheme of mandatory binding arbitra-
tion of malpractice claims. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 26, § 4101 (Supp. 1979).
32. See Abraham, supra note 9, at 513 n.59 (list of 19 state statutes creating screening
panels).
33. See generally Heintz, Arbitration of Medical Malpractice Claims: Is It Cost Effective?, 36
MD. L. REV. 533 (1977). See also Ladimer & Solomon, supra note 31, at 362 app. (list of
general state and federal arbitration statutes that regulate all arbitration by private
agreement).
34. For a thorough analysis of the characteristics of screening panels and arbitration, see
Abraham, supra note 9, at 513-20.
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ing non-judicial systems which they believe most effectively address
the medical malpractice problem in their states, legislatures have
focused on such variables as binding effect, voluntary acceptance,
composition of decision-making panel, jurisdictional limits, formality
of proceedings, submitted issues (liability, damages, or both), eviden-
tiary strength, and scope of judicial review.5
C. A New Framework for Claim Resolution in Maryland
Responding to the continued pressure for a more effective mech-
anism in Maryland for resolving malpractice disputes, the Maryland
General Assembly adopted the Health Care Malpractice Claims
Statute in 1976.16 The new statute modified the traditional resolution
process in three fundamental ways. First, it created an exclusive pro-
cedure for all medical malpractice claims for damages in excess of
$5,000. This procedure entails the review of such claims by an arbi-
tration panel prior to the filing of a court action.37 Second, it provided
that the panel's award would not be binding; any party to the action
may reject the decision of the arbitration panel and take the claim to
court.38 The panel's decision is, however, admissible into evidence in
a subsequent judicial proceeding and carries with it a presumption of
correctness. 39 Finally, the statute created the Health Claims Arbitra-
tion Office to facilitate and expedite the resolution of malpractice
claims.40 The responsibilities of the Office include: assisting the par-
ties in selecting an arbitration panel; providing a mechanism for the
service of claims, pleadings, and subpoenas; performing a variety of
administrative services for the arbitration panel;4 1 and filing in court
for confirmation those panel decisions that are not challenged.4
2
In effect, the statute imposes an additional procedural layer on
the existing framework for tort claims resolution, which is applicable
35. See McGuirk & Rafferty, Medical Malpractice and the Maryland Legislature, 6 MD. L.F.
9, 14-19 (1976).
36. Law of May 4, 1976, ch. 235, 1976 Md. Laws 496 (codified at MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE
ANN. §§ 3-2A-01 to -09 (1980)). The new system created by the statute was consciously
designed to avoid the constitutional infirmities underlying the two programs proposed in
the previous year's House Bill 829 (see text accompanying notes 24-27 supra) and has
since withstood challenges to its constitutionality. Attorney General v. Johnson, 282 Md.
274, 385 A.2d 57, appeal dismissed, 437 U.S. 117 (1978). See 61 Op. Md. Att'y Gen. 175
(1976) in which the Attorney General approved the form, legal sufficiency, and constitu-
tionality of the 1976 act.
37. MD. CM. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-02(a) (1980).
38. Id § 3-2A-06(a)-(b).
39. Id § 3-2A-06(d). The burden of rebutting the presumed correctness of an award rests on
the party who rejects the panel's decision. Id The combination of the right of de novo trial
and the presumption of a correct panel decision makes Maryland's statute unique among
similar legislation in other states.
40. Id § 3-2A-03.
41. Id. § 3-2A-04.
42. Id § 3-2A-05.
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to all claims involving significant medically-related injuries. Under
the statute, actions against a health care provider 3 involving dam-
ages over $5,000 for injuries arising out of alleged malpractice must
be filed with the Director of the Health Claims Arbitration Office."
The ad damnum clause in the initial pleading is disallowed and the
claimant need only allege that his damages are in excess of the
required jurisdictional amount.
4 5
Once a malpractice claim is filed, the Director serves a copy of
the claim upon each health care provider involved.4 The health care
provider must file a response within the time provided in the Mary-
land Rules for filing a responsive pleading to a declaration . 7 Within
twenty days after the time for filing the response, the Director is
charged with providing all parties the names of fifteen prospective
panelists together with a brief biographical statement about each.
4
1
Generally, the arbitration panel consists of three members: an
attorney who serves as chairman and decides all prehearing matters
including issues relating to discovery, 49 a health care provider, and a
member of the general public. 0 Of primary concern is that the
panelists selected have no personal or economic relationships with
any party and, based on their backgrounds, appear capable of ren-
dering a well-reasoned and fair decision." Once the arbitration panel
43. The statute defines "health care provider" broadly to include hospitals and related insti-
tutions, physicians, osteopaths, optometrists, chiropractors, nurses, dentists, podiatrists,
and physical therapists. Id § 3-2A-01(e) (1980). The definition, however, does not include
pharmacists or pharmaceutical laboratories that do business with the medical profession.
44. Id §§ 3-2A-02(a), 3-2A-04(a).
45. Id § 3-2A-02(b); MD. R.P. 307(a), BY 4(b).
46. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-04 (1980).
47. Id § 3-2A-04(a); see MD. R.P. 307 (allowing defendant 15 days after return day to file
initial pleading). The statute also requires that appropriate third party claims be filed with
the health care provider's response to the original claim MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE
ANN. § 3-2A-04(a) (1980).
48. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-04(b) (1980).
49. Id § 3-2A-05(c).
50. Id § 3-2A-03(c). The parties may, within the time prescribed for returning their list of
panelists to the Director, agree to have a single arbitrator serve in place of the arbitration
panel. Id § 3-2A-04(e).
51. The statute and regulations promulgated pursuant to the statute include a procedure for
determining any possible bases for disqualification of prospective panel members and
afford the parties the right to disqualify a certain number of proposed panelists without
cause. Id § 3-2A-04(bHc); COMAR § 01.03.01.07B-D (1976).
To date, the Health Claims Arbitration Office has gathered the names of some 3,000
prospective panel members and has developed a procedure whereby selection from the
pool of volunteers is done completely at randon. In addition, the Office has classified the
prospective health care provider panelists according to their fields of specialty in order to
increase the likelihood that the health care panelists ultimately selected will be assigned to
claims involving their field of expertise. See MD. CIrs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-03(c)
(1980).
In an apparent effort to encourage greater participation by members of the profes-
sions and the public, the Maryland General Assembly amended the statute in 1980 to pro-
vide that each arbitrator shall have immunity from suit for "any act or decision made dur-
ing tenure and within the scope of designated authority," absent a showing of malice or
bad faith. Id § 3-2A-04(f).
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is formed, it assumes responsibility for ruling on all issues of law and
fact raised at the proceedings and exercises its authority by a
majority.
52
The Maryland discovery rules53 and certain provisions of the
Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act 54 apply to the prehearing pro-
ceedings.55 The arbitration panel may set the time period within
which discovery and other procedural matters must be completed.
56
A prehearing conference with the chairman of the panel must be held
at least thirty days before the hearings begin.57 The arbitration panel
sets the time and place for all hearings and must give the parties at
least five days notice.5 8
Each party has the right to be represented by an attorney at any
phase of the proceedings and, at the hearing, each party has the
right to be heard, to present evidence material to the controversy,
and to cross-examine witnesses.5 9 During the hearing, the panel is
not bound by the technical rules of evidence.60 The panel may issue
subpoenas, which are subject to court enforcement, for the attend-
ance of witnesses and for the production of records and other evi-
dence.' The panelists may also question witnesses and order the fil-
ing of briefs.62 All proceedings are preserved for the record on tape
recordings.
6 3
In arriving at a decision on a claim, the panel first determines
the issue of liability. 64 If they decide this threshold question in favor
of the claimant, the panel proceeds to consider, assess, and apportion
appropriate damages against each of the health care providers found
52. MD. CIS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-05(a) (1980).
53. MD. R.P. 400-425.
54. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-212 to -217, 3-220 (1980).
55. Id § 3-2A-05(b).
56. COMAR § 01.03.01.09C (1976).
57. Id § 01.03.01.10B-C.
58. Id § 01.03.01.1 1A-B. Unless all the parties agree otherwise, all hearings must be held in
a county of proper venue and at a place as close as possible to the claimant's residence.
Id § 01.03.01.11A.
59. Id § 01.03.01.11E. Although a party may proceed without an attorney, the arbitration
panel is charged with informing the party of the complexity of the health care claims pro-
cedure and the advisability of legal representation. Id
60. Id § 01.03.01.11D.
61. Id § 01.03.01.11F.
62. Id § 01.03.01.11G, I.
63. Id. § 01.03.01.11H.
64. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-05(d) (1980).
1980]
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liable.6 In addition to determining the amount of the award, if any,
the arbitration panel is responsible for assessing the costs of the pro-
ceedings against either one or, by apportionment, all of the parties.
66
The panel is required to file its award, specifying the amounts of any
damages awarded and costs assessed, with the Director of the
Health Claims Arbitration Office within five days after the close of
the hearing.67 The statute does not require the panel to cite in its
written decision the evidence or legal authority upon which it relied.
After the arbitration panel files the award with the Director, a
party may attempt to have the award, if impaired by a technical
defect, modified by the panel. 68 A party may also reject the panel's
65. Id Advance payments from a medical malpractice liability insurer do not constitute an
admission of liability, MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 482A (1979), but, if the claimant has
received any advance payments, evidence of the amount is admissible at this stage of the
proceedings. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-08(a) (1980). In such event, the
panel must make a finding of total damages and then adjust them by the amount of
advance payments. Id A successful claimant has the option of receiving his award in
lump sum or in periodic payments. Id § 3-2A-08(b).
Under the traditional tort system, the state's Uniform Contribution Among Tort-
Feasors Act, MD. ANN. CODE art. 50, §§ 16-24 (1979), holds responsible for contribution
on a pro rata basis any party found liable to a claimant. The arbitration statute, however,
permits the panel to apportion the damages if more than one health care provider is found
liable. MD. CM. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-05(d) (1980). The reference to contribution
is found in the section of the regulations governing adjustments of awards when total
damages are less than the amount of advance payments. COMAR § 01.03.01.12C(3H4).
Allowing the panel to apportion damages commendably provides the panel added flexibil-
ity in assessing damages against each health care provider involved.
66. MD. CrS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-05(e) (1980). These costs include the panelists'
fees - $60 per diem for the chairman and $40 per diem for the other two arbitrators.
COMAR § 01.03.01.12D(2) (1976). According to a recent opinion of the Attorney General
of Maryland, arbitration costs also include deposition fees, but neither attorneys' fees nor
expert witness' fees may be assessed against the losing party. 80 Op. Md. Att'y Gen. 52
(Aug. 6, 1980) (unpublished).
Under the statute, the panel must approve all attorneys' fees for services rendered in
connection with the arbitration process. MD. CS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-07
(1980). Similarly, attorneys' fees charged for services rendered during subsequent judicial
proceedings are subject to the approval of the court. Id
67. MD. CM. & JUD. PROC." CODE ANN. § 3-2A-05(f) (1980); COMAR § 01.03.01.12E (1976).
68. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-2A-05(g), 3-222 (1980). Service of the award on the
parties triggers a 20-day period within which any party may apply for a modification by
the panel of its award. Id; COMAR § 01.03.01.13A(1) (1976). Such an appeal may be
premised only on the incorrect form of an award or an evident mistake or miscalculation
not affecting the panel's determination on the merits of the claim. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC.
CODE ANN. §§ 3-222 to -223 (1980); COMAR § 01.03.01.13B (1976). Within 20 days after
the referral of an appeal, the panel must respond in writing to the Director, indicating its
determination and submitting any modification it deems appropriate. Id.
§ 01.03.01.13C(1). If a party misses the 20-day period for applying to the arbitration panel
to modify or correct a technically defective award, he may still seek the modification or
correction from the circuit court by way of an action to nullify. See MD. CM. & JUD. PROC.
CODE ANN. § 3-2A06(a) (1980); COMAR § 01.03.01.14 (1976).
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decision by petitioning in circuit court
69 to nullify the award.70 If
appropriate, the court may correct 71 or even vacate72 the award. If
the award is vacated, the case proceeds through the court on its
merits and as if there had been no award.7 3 Unless vacated by the
court, the arbitration award is admissible as evidence in an action to
nuify.7 1 In this case, the award is presumed correct and the burden
is on the party rejecting it to prove by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the panel's award was improper. After the time for either
rejecting or modifying the award has expired, the Director must file
a copy of the award with the appropriate circuit court.75 Upon confir-
mation by the court, the award constitutes a final judgment.
III. THE STATUTE ON TRIAL
A. Constitutionality - Attorney General v. Johnson
Shortly after the innovation of the malpractice claims process in
1976, medical malpractice claimants filed suit in the Baltimore City
Court, seeking a declaratory judgment that the statute violated
federal and state constitutional provisions and that the plaintiffs
could pursue their claim in court without first submitting it to arbi-
tration. 76 The trial court heard a variety of constitutional issues and
69. Venue for the action to nullify is determined in accordance with the Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Code. MD. CM. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-06(f) (1980); see id § 6-201.
70. Id § 3-2A-06(a) (1980). A notice of such a rejection must be filed with the Director and the
arbitration panel and served on the other parties or their counsel within 90 days of service
of the panel's award or, if an application for modification or correction has been filed,
within 30 days after disposition of the application by the panel. Id; MD. R.P. BY 1-5.
Within the same time period, the party rejecting the award must file an action in court to
nullify the award. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-06(b) (1980). An action to
nullify is governed by the Maryland Rules of Procedure. Id Any party to this court pro-
ceeding may elect to have the case tried by a jury. Id
The assessment of costs incurred in the judicial proceedings usually is subject to the
court's discretion. Id § 3-2A-06(e). However, if the trial verdict is less favorable to the
rejecting party than the panel's award, the rejecting party is liable for all costs.
71. MD. CS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-06(c) (1980); see id § 3-223.
72. Id § 3-2A-06(c). A party may petition the court to vacate the panel's award on such
grounds as fraud, corruption, or partiality. See id § 3-224. A petition of this kind must be
made by pretrial preliminary motion, which is reviewed by the court without a jury. Id §
3-2A-06(c). Failure to use the proper procedure constitutes a waiver of the defense. The
court is empowered to vacate the award or to make any appropriate modifications or cor-
rections. If the court modifies the award, the modified award is substituted for the panel's
award for purposes of further judicial proceedings. Id
73. Id
74. Id § 3-2A.06(d).
75. Id § 3-2A-05(h).
76. Attorney General v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 278, 385 A.2d 57, 60, appeal dismissed, 437
U.S. 117 (1978).
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entered judgment declaring the statute invalid. In its decision, the
trial court held that the statute unconstitutionally vested judicial
power in an administrative agency and imposed procedural and
monetary impediments sufficiently substantial to deny malpractice
claimants reasonable access to the courts and the attendant right to
trial by jury. The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari to
consider these important constitutional questions. 7
1. Improper Delegation of Judicial Power
The court of appeals in Attorney General v. JohnsonT7 first con-
sidered whether the statute vests judicial power in an administrative
agency contrary to the mandates of the Constitution of Maryland,
which provide that judicial power be vested in enumerated courts,79
that the powers of the three departments of government be "forever
separate and distinct, and that no person exercising the functions of
one branch may discharge the duties of another."80 As a preliminary
matter, the court disposed of the assertion that the statute imper-
missibly vests judicial power in an administrative agency by noting
that the arbitration panel is not an agency in the traditional sense
and that the Health Claims Arbitration Office, which is an agency,
exercises no judicial function.8 ' In rejecting the contention that the
statute violates the separation of powers doctrine, the court stated
that the performance of certain judicial functions by a non-judicial
body is not in and of itself dispositive 2 Otherwise, the court noted,
"[N]o administrative agency performing an adjudicatory function
could survive constitutional muster."83 The court emphasized that
two significant limitations on the arbitration procedure distinguish
the panel from a court of law, which alone has the power to render
and enforce a judgment. First, the parties are in no way bound by
the award. Second, the panel cannot itself enforce the award.8 4
77. The court of appeals granted certiorari before the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
reviewed the case. Id See MD. 0TS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 12-203 (1980).
78. 282 Md. 274, 385 A.2d 57, appeal dismissed, 437 U.S. 117 (1978). For a thorough analysis
of the Johnson decision, see Mediation Panels, supra note 13.
79. MD. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
80. MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 8.
81. 282 Md. 274, 284, 385 A.2d 57, 63, appeal dismissed, 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
82. Id
83. Id
84. Id The court concluded its treatment of this argument by citing extensively authority in
other jurisdictions in accord with the proposition that a statutory requirement that dis-
putes be subject to a non-judicial entity for determination prior to court action is not an
unconstitutional delegation of judicial power. Id Many of these cases involved review of
legislation similar to Maryland's Health Care Malpractice Claims Statute. E.g., Eastin v.
Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 582, 570 P.2d 744, 750 (1977); Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb.
97, 110, 256 N.W.2d 657, 666-67 (1977); State ex reL Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d
491, 520-22, 261 N.W.2d 434, 448-49 (1978); see also Everett v. Goldman, 359 So. 2d
1256 (La. 1978); Paro v. Longwood Hosp., 373 Mass. 645, 396 N.E.2d 985 (1977); Parker v.
Children's Hosp. of Phil., 483 Pa. 106, 394 A.2d 932 (1978). Contra Wright v. Central
DuPage Hosp. Ass'n, 63 11. 2d 313,347 N.E.2d 736 (1976); Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d
125 (N.D. 1978). See generally Annot., 80 A.L.R.3d 583, 602--03 (1977).
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2. Denial of Access to Courts and Right to Trial by Jury
The court of appeals next rejected arguments that the statute
creates procedural and monetary impediments calculated to inhibit a
claimant from pursuing court action in the face of an adverse award
from an arbitration panel. The appellees alleged that the substantial
expense of producing expert witnesses for a panel hearing, signifi-
cant lengthening of time necessary to achieve a final judicial resolu-
tion of a claim, and necessity of overcoming the presumption of cor-
rectness of a panel decision at a subsequent thal "deny a claimant
reasonable access to the courts and his attendant constitutional
right to trial by jury."'85 Other infringements on these dual rights
alleged by the appellees included the statute's failure to allow the
claimant to attack the panel decision before the jury on the grounds
that it was procured by corruption, fraud, undue means, or par-
tiality, failure to allow voir dire of the arbitration panel, imposition of
costs and fees before access to the courts can be gained, and court
control of attorneys' fees. The court considered these allegations
seriatim.
In response to attacks on the statutory provision allowing into
evidence the findings of the arbitration panel, the court held that the
provision is essentially a rule of evidence. 86 Not unlike existing rules
in the state's law of evidence, the rule creates a presumption and,
under certain circumstances, shifts the burden of proof. This result,
according to the court, is perfectly permissible under state and
federal case law."7 The court noted that when the malpractice claim-
ant appeals, the rule has no effect on his burden of proof with regard
to primary negligence. Furthermore, the presiding judge, not the
jury, has the discretion to exclude from evidence the panel's award
when an adequate basis for exclusion is presented by preliminary
motion.8 Consequently, an attack on the panel's award on the basis
that it was procured by fraud or corruption is an issue for the judge
alone to resolve. The court concluded that, in any event, the rule does
not remove any questions of fact from the judge or jury, nor does it
deprive a party of the right to present fully his case to the jury. 9
The court also rejected the appellees' assertion that claimants
are denied due process by the statute's failure to provide an oppor-
tunity to conduct a voir dire examination of prospective members of
the arbitration panel so as to assure their freedom from bias and
partiality.90 Several features of the new procedure, including the
85. 282 Md. 274, 291, 385 A.2d 57, 67, appeal dismissed, 437 U.S. 117 (1978). See MD. CONST.
art. XV, § 6; MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTs arts. 5, 19, 23.
86. 282 Md. 274, 293-94, 385 A.2d 57, 68-69, appeal dismissed, 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
87. Id at 294, 385 A.2d at 69.
88. Id at 296, 385 A.2d at 70.
89. Id at 294-95, 385 A.2d at 69 (citing Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 236 U.S. 412 (1915)).
90. 282 Md. 274, 296-97, 385 A.2d 57, 70, appeal dismissed, 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
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random selection of panelists, the parties' right to strike panelists
with or without cause, and the liberty to reject the arbitration award
for any reason and have the claim tried by a jury, militate against
this contention.91
The most formidable argument against the statute concerned
the additional expense and delay inevitably incurred when a party
rejects the decision of the arbitration panel and elects court proceed-
ings.92 The Johnson appellees contended that these hindrances deny
malpractice claimants access to the courts and the right to a jury
trial guaranteed by Maryland's Declaration of Rights.93 Dismissing
these contentions, the court of appeals concurred with Wisconsin's
highest court, which, in reviewing similar legislation, observed that
"[sitates are under no constitutional obligation to neutralize the
economic disparities which inevitably make resort to the courts dif-
ferent for some plaintiffs than others." 94 The court of appeals noted
that other state appellate courts have uniformly held that legislative
attempts to reduce the cost of medical expenses by lowering mal-
practice insurance premiums are constitutional exercises of the
state's police power.95 It also noted that access to the courts and the
right to a jury trial are subject to reasonable regulation. Based on its
analysis of the effects and purpose of the new malpractice procedure,
91. Id The court further noted that, as a general rule, voir dire examination is not provided in
connection with panels, boards, or commissions. Id
92. Id at 297-98, 385 A.2d at 71. One commentator has suggested that the preparation prior
to screening panel review in most cases functions merely as an accelerated form of
discovery for the actual trial with practically the same effect in terms of expense and
delay on litigants as the various discovery devices and pretrial hearings generally
accepted as necessary facets of any claims resolution process. Redish, Legislative
Response to the Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis: Constitutional Implications, 55
Thx. L. REV. 759, 796 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Redish].
93. 282 Md. 274, 297-98, 385 A.2d 57, 71, appeal dismissed, 437 U.S. 117 (1978). See MD.
CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 19; MD. CONST. art. XV, § 6.
94. Id at 298, 385 A.2d at 71 (quoting State ex rel Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491,
511-12, 261 N.W.2d 434, 444 (1978)). See also Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802,
805-06 (Fla. 1976), cert denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977); Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97,
110-15, 256 N.W.2d 657, 667-69 (1977).
95. 282 Md. 274, 298, 385 A.2d 57, 71, appeal dismissed, 437 U.S. 117 (1978) (citing Carter v.
Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 1976), cert denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977); State ex reL
Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 261 N.W.2d 434 (1978)). See Redish, supra note 92,
at 796 ("If a legislature intends the screening panel procedure to function as an
institutionalized attempt to encourage settlement, and the physical and financial burdens
it imposes on potential plaintiffs [are] kept to a minimum, the constitutional obstacles
should not prove insurmountable.").
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the court concluded that the statute's regulation of these rights is
reasonable.96
Under the statute, attorneys' fees in connection with arbitration
and judicial proceedings must be approved by the arbitration panel
and the court respectively.9 7 The appellees claimed that this provi-
sion violates the due process clauses of the Maryland and federal
constitutions on the theory that the legislation unduly interferes
with the right of parties to contract with an attorney.98 To this con-
tention the court responded that the applicable provision of the
statute effects no deprivation of property or interference with the
right to contract." All contracts, it noted, are subject to reasonable
regulation and there are several statutes, state and federal, that sub-
ject attorneys' fees to the approval of the court.1°0
3. Denial of Equal Protection and Due Process
Lastly, the appellees asserted that the statute deprived them of
the equal protection of the laws in violation of the fourteenth amend-
ment and of the due process clause contained in the Maryland Decla-
ration of Rights.10 1 The trial court had held that the statute violated
neither of these provisions. 0 2 Agreeing with the trial court on this
point, the court of appeals reviewed the evidence introduced at trial
upon which the lower court had relied: the existence of a medical mal-
practice insurance crisis in Maryland, the continued instability of the
insurance market even after the creation of the Medical Mutual Lia-
bility Insurance Society, 0 3 the recommendation of the General
96. The court explained:
We find that our analysis of the reasonableness of this Act's regulation of
the jury trial right - by virtue of its regulation of access to the courts generally
- begins and ends with a proposition long ago announced by our predecessors
as "fully established": that "where a law secures the trial by jury upon an appeal,
it is no violation of a constitutional provision for guarding that right; although
such law may provide for a primary trial without the intervention of a jury."
282 Md. 274, 301, 385 A.2d 57, 72-73, appeal dismissed 437 U.S. 117 (1978) (emphasis in
original) (quoting Steuart v. Baltimore, 7 Md. 500,512 (1855)). In addition, the court noted
that the essential ingredients of the right to jury trial are not lost under the new pro-
cedure. No court costs are imposed on the litigants as a precondition to the court proceed-
ing or jury trial Also, any delay caused by the procedure is not atypical of a variety of
two-step proceedings in Maryland, notably the Workmen's Compensation claims pro-
cedure, the constitutionality of which is no longer in doubt.
97. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-07 (1980).
98. 282 Md. 274, 305, 385 A.2d 57, 75, appeal dismissed 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
99. Id at 305-06, 385 A.2d at 75.
100. Id The court cited as examples Maryland's Workmen's Compensation Act, MD. ANN.
CODE art. 101, § 57 (1979); the Unemployment Insurance Law, MD. ANN. CODE art. 95A,
§ 16(b) (1979); and the Federal Torts Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2678 (1976). 282 Md. 274,
305-06, 385 A.2d 57, 75, appeal dismissed 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
101. MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 23.
102. 282 Md. 274, 308, 385 A.2d 57, 76-77, appeal dismissed 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
103. See notes 14-20 and accompanying text supra
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Assembly's Medical Malpractice Insurance Study Committee to
pass remedial legislation similar to the present statute, and the
effects of the crisis on the consumer of medical services. 0 4 Based on
these considerations and the belief that the statute bears a fair and
substantial relation to its avowed purpose, the court held that the
statute did not deny the plaintiffs their rights to due process or to
equal protection of the law."°5 With its analysis and rejection of the
various objections to the statute completed, the court of appeals
upheld the constitutionality of the statute.106
B. Further Challenges to the Statute
Since the court of appeals' decision in A ttorney General v. John-
son, several malpractice claimants have attempted to avoid the
requirements of the arbitration procedure and the effect of a panel
award by resorting to loopholes in the language of the statute. In
addition, another attack on the constitutionality of the statute has
been mounted, this time because it is allegedly unconstitutional in
its application.
In the case of Davison v. Sinai Hospital of Baltimore,10 7 the
claimants filed a medical malpractice suit in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Maryland without first complying with
the arbitration procedures under the statute. The plaintiffs alleged
that the federal court had jurisdiction due to the diversity of citizen-
ship of the parties.08 They conceded that the statute requires arbi-
tration as a prerequisite to such a suit in a Maryland state court, but
argued that the statute, by its terms, excludes federal courts from
its coverage because "court" is defined in the statute as "a circuit
104. 282 Md. 274, 306-08, 385 A.2d 57, 76, appeal dismissed 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
105. Id at 309, 385 A.2d at 77. The court discussed the appropriate standard to be applied to
the statute under the equal protection clause. The appellees argued that the strict
scrutiny test be utilized, asserting that the statute interfered with a fundamental right -
the right to trial by jury - and, alternatively, that the statute allowed disparate treat-
ment of a suspect class, presumably referring to malpractice claimants. Noting that it
earlier rejected the contention that the statute unduly inhibits the right to jury trial and
dismissing the contention of a suspect class, the court turned to consider the impact of
the traditional rational basis test. Id at 312, 385 A.2d at 78-79. Applying this test, the
court concluded that the "distinction between malpractice claimants and other tort
claimants is reasonably related to the legitimate purpose of the Act, namely the protec-
tion of the public health and welfare by assuring the availability of malpractice insurance
at reasonable rates." Id. at 312, 385 A.2d at 78. In so holding, the court suggested that
the application of the more onerous intermediate or "means-focused" test would produce
the same result. The classification of malpractice claimants, the court reasoned, "rests
upon a ground of difference bearing a 'fair and substantial relation' to the object of the
legislation, to encourage the resolution of such claims without judicial proceedings, thus
reducing their costs and consequently the cost of insurance." Id at 312-13, 385 A.2d at
79.
106. Id at 313-14, 385 A.2d at 80.
107. 462 F. Supp. 778 (D. Md. 1978), aff'd, 617 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980).
108. Id at 779.
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court of a county or court of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City
having jurisdiction over actions at law." 109 In addition, the plaintiffs
argued that the Malpractice Claims Act deprives claimants of the
right to a jury trial guaranteed by the seventh amendment for civil
suits in federal courts.'10 The district court rejected both contentions.
Looking to the legislative history of the Act, the district court
found no discussion of the role of federal courts in deciding Maryland
medical malpractice cases, but resolved that the limited definition of
"court" was intended to insure that claimants with suits for less
than $5,000 have immediate access to state district courts without
first going through arbitration.' The court determined that the
statute applies with equal force to federal courts, relying on Erie
Railroad v. Tompkins" 2 and its progeny for the proposition that the
statute is substantive, not procedural, and therefore must be applied
uniformly to all malpractice claims in order to avoid forum-shop-
ping.1 Otherwise, reasoned the court, "[Pilaintiffs who wished to
avoid going through a preliminary arbitration proceeding might well
be tempted to try to manufacture diversity of citizenship of parties
in order to get into federal court."1 1 4 Responding to the plaintiff's
constitutional argument, the court pointed out that the issue was
satisfactorily resolved in Attorney General v. Johnson"' and agreed
that the Act does not work a deprivation of malpractice claimants'
right to a jury trial in Maryland. 116 The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit has affirmed the Davison decision.
17
In Bishop v. Holy Cross Hospit4 "' the appellant filed suit in
the Circuit Court for Montgomery County alleging various acts of
medical malpractice by the appellees, without first submitting the
109. MD. C'S. & JUD. PRoc. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-01(c) (1980). Note also that the statute refers to
"any court of this State." Id § 3-2A-02(a).
110. 462 F. Supp. 778, 781 (D. Md. 1978), aff'4 617 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980).
111. Id at 779.
112. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
113. Davison v. Sinai Hosp. of Baltimore, 462 F. Supp. 778, 780 (D. Md. 1978), aff4 617 F.2d
361 (4th Cir. 1980).
114. Id In regard to the plaintiff's contention that § 3-2A-09 indicates that the statute, by its
very terms, is intended to be procedural, the court ruled that the provision was intended
to indicate that the legislature was not attempting to create a new cause of action
in passing the statute. Id Most courts interpreting similar state statutes requiring
parties to arbitrate malpractice claims have held that the Erie line of cases requires the
result reached by this court. See Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164 (5th Cir.
1979); Hines v..Elkhart Gen. Hosp., 465 F. Supp. 421 (N.D. Ind. 1979); Wells v. McCarthy,
432 F. Supp. 688 (E.D. Mo. 1977); Marquez v. Hahnemann Medical College & Hosp., 435
F. Supp. 972 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Flotemersch v. Bedford County Gen. Hosp., 69 F.R.D. 556
(E.D. Tenn. 1975). But see Wheeler v. Shoemaker, 78 F.R.D. 218, 221-22 (D.R.I. 1978).
115. 282 Md. 274, 385 A.2d 57, appeal dismissed 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
116. 462 F. Supp. 778, 781 (D. Md. 1978), aff4 617 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980).
117. 617 F.2d 361 (1980).
118. 44 Md. App. 688, 410 A.2d 630 (1980).
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claim to the Health Claims Arbitration Office for arbitration. The cir-
cuit court ruled that it had no jurisdiction over the claim because the
appellant had not exhausted all administrative remedies as required
by section 3-2A-02 of the statute.119 On appeal, the appellant argued
that the arbitration panel's power to assess "appropriate damages"
as that term is used in section 3-2A-05(d) does not encompass
punitive damages and that, consequently, the panel was without
authority to hear the claim, which involved punitive as well as com-
pensatory damages.12 In affirming the judgment of the lower court,
the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland correctly held that the
plain meaning of the term "appropriate damages" is any kind of
damages, including punitive damages, that the arbitration panel
chooses to award.121 A contrary interpretation of the term would
clearly have been inconsistent with the purpose of the statute, which
is to encourage early settlement or voluntary dismissal of claims by
first subjecting those claims to non-binding arbitration.
The alleged failure of the Health Claims Arbitration Office to
schedule arbitration of claims on a timely basis has provoked the
recent filing of a class action against the state, captioned Walker v.
Hughes.'22 The suit seeks a determination of whether the statute is
being administered in an unconstitutional fashion due to the lack of
funding and staff for the Office, the lack of qualified volunteer arbi-
trators, and the resulting backlog of claims.123 In addition to a declar-
atory judgment, the plaintiffs also request that the court allow them
to proceed with prosecuting their claims in court, issue a writ of
mandamus compelling the state to take the necessary action to
correct the malfunctioning of the arbitration procedure, and award
damages for injuries sustained to date.
The filing of the Walker action is largely a result of the number
of claims submitted to the Health Claims Arbitration Office, which
has been hampered since its inception in 1976 in effectively perform-
ing its responsibilities under the statute. During the two-year period
of the Johnson12' litigation, .only six claims were filed with the
Office; 25 most plaintiffs apparently refrained from filing claims
119. Id at 689, 410 A.2d at 631.
120. Id at 690, 410 A.2d at 632.
121. Id at 692, 410 A.2d at 632.
'122. Civ. Docket No. 115, Folio 625, Case No. 104893 (Balt. City Ct., filed Feb. 26, 1980).
123. Id The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recently declared unconstitutional the provision
of that commonwealth's Health Care Services Malpractice Act that granted arbitration
panels original exclusive jurisdiction over medical malpractice claims. Mattos v. Thomp-
son, - Pa. - 421 A.2d 190 (1980); see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.309 (Purdon
Supp. 1980). The court, which had upheld the constitutionality of the Act on its face two
years earlier in Parker v. Children's Hosp. of Phil., 483 Pa. 106, 394 A.2d 932 (1978), found
that the delay caused by the arbitration procedure made the parties' right to a jury trial
practically unavailable. - Pa. at - , 421 A.2d at 195-96.
124. 282 Md. 274, 385 A.2d 57, appeal dismissed, 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
125. Interview with Walter R. Tabler, Director of the Health Claims Arbitration Office, in
Baltimore, Maryland (Oct. 14, 1980).
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pending a determination of the statute's constitutionality. Since the
Johnson decision in 1978, the Office has been deluged with claims.
The large number of claims represents both a substantial backlog of
claims that went unfiled during the pendency of the Johnson litiga-
tion and an unexpectedly high number of claims filed since the reso-
lution of that case. As of January 1, 1981, approximately 715 claims
for medically-related injuries had been filed with the Health Claims
Arbitration Office. Of those 715 cases, approximately 107 were set-
tled prior to an arbitration hearing and approximately 37 had gone
through the entire arbitration procedure.'2 6 The nearly 600 cases
remaining were either still in arbitration or only in the process of
being scheduled for arbitration. In addition to the large number of
claims, the substantial delay in scheduling and completing arbitra-
tion has been exacerbated by inadequate government funding and
staffing of the Office and a lack of qualified volunteers for panelist
positions in various regions of the state.
IV. AN ASSESSMENT OF MARYLAND'S
ARBITRATION LAW
The many problems that have plagued the new arbitration pro-
cedure to date make it impossible to assess whether the procedure is
really capable of reducing the inequities and substantial costs
associated with the litigation of malpractice claims. Only further
experience with a procedure unfettered by inadequate funding and
manpower will tell. Nevertheless, some general observations about
the potential efficacy of the procedure may be premised on past
studies of similar screening programs and on a comparison of the
major features of the old and new claims resolution processes in
Maryland.
Systems to resolve disputes between parties, whether judicial,
administrative, or contractual, should provide a just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination. The following comments are made in the
context of the perceived objectives of Maryland's new malpractice
claims resolution system: rapid determination of claims, cost effec-
tiveness, and, most importantly, substantial justice.
Cost savings and time savings represent substantially similar
goals - the more rapidly a dispute is resolved, the lower the overall
costs that will be incurred by all parties involved. Several analyses of
alternative claims resolution mechanisms conducted in recent years
suggest the possibility of substantial savings by using a procedure
126. Id Of the 37 cases that had gone through the entire arbitration process, approximatey 15
were resolved in favor of plaintiffs and approximately 22 were resolved in favor of defend-
ants. Eleven of those 37 cases have been appealed on the merits, and 4 have been brought
to trial. The panel's award has been sustained in each instance.
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that deters further litigation in court after an initial resolution.127 A
study conducted in 1973 by the Secretary of Health, Education and
Welfare's Commission on Medical Malpractice compared the per-
formance of the traditional tort system with a variety of state and
privately sponsored screening panels and arbitration boards.1 2
Based on the Commission's findings, the study provides significant
support for the claims of the efficiency and cost effectiveness poten-
tial of Maryland's new procedure.
The study compared all the important costs of prosecuting a
claim through a non-judicial panel as opposed to a court, including
attorneys' and expert witnesses' fees and costs of discovery. To the
extent that these panels reached a decision with finality, the study
determined that sizeable reductions in administrative costs could be
realized. 129 De novo review, however, compounds these costs. Thus,
in order to reduce the overall costs of Maryland's procedure, the
panel decision must be the final decision frequently enough to recoup
the compounded costs of de novo reviews.
Another major finding of the federal study was that the overall
time involved in resolving a malpractice dispute was far shorter for
screening panels than for ordinary litigation.13° The average delay
between filing a claim and the hearing was six months for a screen-
ing panel compared to eighteen months for a court action. 31 Further,
a hearing before a screening panel took less time than a trial before a
court.112 In general, the screening panels appeared to offer speedy
disposition and administrative efficiency unmatched by the courts.
Maryland's procedure, which includes several features not
shared by any of the aforementioned screening panels, may serve to
further reduce excessive expense and delay. First, the statute calls
for extensive panel and court control over attorneys' fees and cost
assessments.1 33 Second, the regulations contain an express provision
for incorporating settlement agreements into the panel's award.
34
127. E.g., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S COM-
MISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (1973) [hereinafter cited as SECRETARY'S COMMISSION
REPORT]; Heintz, Arbitration of Medical Malpractice Claims: Is It Cost Effective?, 36 MD.
L. REV. 533 (1977).
128. See SECRETARY'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 127, at 214-314.
129. Id at 276-79, 309-14.
130. Id at 253-59.
131. Id at 257.
132. Id at 258.
133. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A4)7 (1980).
134. COMAR § 01.03.01.12F (1976).
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Third, the panelists' fees are set at a relatively modest level"'s and
the Health Claims Arbitration Office absorbs many of the adminis-
trative costs of the procedure. Finally, the statute mandates the
mediation of all significant malpractice claims by the arbitration
panel 36 and makes the decision of the panel admissible, with a
presumption of correctness, in subsequent judicial proceedings. 137
These two features in particular are intended to encourage the early
settlement of claims and discourage frivolous litigation. If one of the
parties to a dispute decides to reject the panel's award and proceed
to court, both parties are likely to incur costs and time delays not
built into the traditional resolution process. The party seeking rejec-
tion of the panel's award, however, is dissuaded because he bears the
added burden in court of rebutting the presumed correctness of the
panel's award. Thus, the rule is an important cost-saving measure in
that it encourages an early and thorough resolution of the claim at
arbitration.
It is not clear from the decision in Attorney General v. John-
son138 how thoroughly the court considered the combined effect of
mandatory pretrial arbitration and the presumed correctness of
panel awards on a losing party's decision to seek a de novo trial. The
burden on the rejecting party of persuading the jury that the panel's
decision is wrong is made somewhat onerous by several factors.
First, in the absence of compelling evidence contrary to the panel's
award, juries will probably place much credence in the presumption
that the decision of the panel is correct. 139 Second, the panel, which
135. Id § 01.03.01.12D(2). "The chairman of an arbitration panel is entitled to receive a $60 per
diem. Each other member of an arbitration panel is entitled to receive a $40 per diem." Id
Panel members may also be reimbursed for expenses incurred in transacting the panel's
business. Id § 01.03.01.12D(4).
To date, the effort to save money by setting panelists' fees at such modest levels has
been self-defeating. It appears that many professionals have avoided participating as
panelists out of concern that they might become involved in protracted hearings for vir-
tually nominal compensation. The Health Claims Arbitration Office has made attempts to
increase the fees paid panelists, but it is doubtful whether such increases, unless substan-
tial, will have a significant impact on the number of volunteers.
In light of the difficulty of obtaining professionals to participate as panelists, the lack
of consistency in panel decisions which will inevitably flow from having a new panel
assembled for each claim, and the problems inherent in not having written awards that
outline the law and facts upon which they are premised, the General Assembly should
investigate the establishment of a permanent panel or group of regional panels. Such a
panel or panels could be composed of salaried arbitrators whose functions and powers
would be similar to those of administrative law judges.
136. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-02 (1980).
137. Id § 3-2A-06(d).
138. 282 Md. 274, 385 A.2d 57, appeal dismissed 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
139. The Maryland legislature's failure to define "correctness" (ie., "in accordance with the
law?") under the statute has been criticized. Note, Medical Malpractice Arbitration: A
Comparative Analysis, 62 VA. L. REV. 1285, 1305 (1976).
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presides effectively as judge and jury at arbitration, does not issue a
written decision citing the evidence and law upon which it relied.140
Finally, it is widely believed that no member of the panel can be
called to testify at trial, although the statute is silent on this point.
1 41
The rejecting party, consequently, has no way to dispute the method
used by the panel to arrive at its award. The Court of Appeals of
Maryland suggested that "[w]hen the malpractice claimant is the
party appealing, the statutory provision... has no effect whatever
on his burden of proof in respect to primary negligence. '14 Admit-
tedly, the plaintiff must always prove his case by a preponderance of
the evidence. But, practically speaking, it is hard to believe that an
adverse panel decision would not impair the plaintiff's case. In the
process of proving his case, the plaintiff must not only rebut by a
preponderance of the evidence a panel decision that is considered
"prima facie correct," he must also affirmatively prove his case by
the same preponderance. A plaintiff's unsuccessful attack on a panel
decision, about which he has little information, will necessarily
undermine his case with respect to primary negligence, and juries
are not likely to disregard entirely the evidence of the award unless
the plaintiff satisfactorily establishes why it was incorrect.143 More-
over, because the court has the power to alter a panel award and
assess court costs,144 the party, whether claimant or health care pro-
140. See COMAR §§ 01.03.01.11-.12 (1976). Although these regulations require the panel to
record all proceedings and to submit a written award to the Director of the Health Claims
Arbitration Office, no provision requires the panel to explain the reasoning behind the
award. However, no compelling policy or evidentiary arguments prohibit the introduction
of transcripts of the arbitration proceedings at a trial de novo. By introducing the
transcript at trial, the party rejecting the panel's decision may try to persuade the jury
that the panel had no basis for its decisions on liability or the amount of the award,
thereby rebutting the presumption that the panel's decision was correct. The fact that the
regulations under the statute require the recordation of these proceedings further sug-
gests the permissibility of their use as evidence.
141. Arbitration statutes, in other states, that address this issue go both ways. Compare Auz.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-567L (1980) (prohibits judge sitting as panelist from presiding at
trial of same case and the participation in the trial of other panelists as witnesses) with
N.Y. JuD. LAW § 148-a(8) (McKinney Supp. 1980) (allows either party to the suit to sub-
poena doctor or attorney member of arbitration board when written recommendation of
board is entered into evidence at trial) and OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.21(D) (Page Supp.
1980) (allows party not offering board decision to subpoena and cross-examine board
members). Cf Abrams v. Brooklyn Hosp., 91 Misc. 2d 380, 398 N.Y.S.2d 114 (1977) (to
foreclose a member of a medical malpractice panel from testifying as to specific findings
would negate mandate of legislature to have jury pass upon probative value or weight of
panel finding).
142. Attorney General v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 293-94, 385 A.2d 57, 68-69, appeal dis-
missed, 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
143. For further insight into this problem, see Mediation Panes supra note 13, at 92-97.
144. MD. CM. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-06(e) (1980).
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vider, who desires a de novo trial faces the risk of receiving an even
less favorable verdict in court as well as being assessed all the court
costs. Thus, unless the rejecting party can persuade the court, sit-
ting without a jury, to vacate the award, his prospects for success in
a de novo trial may be hampered significantly by this presumption of
correctness. Although this feature may enhance the efficiency and
cost effectiveness of the new procedure, its fairness in application
remains uncertain. In spite of the Johnson court's rejection of the
argument that the presumption of correctness violates the right to a
jury trial by deterring a party from appealing the panel decision,
such deterrence undeniably imposes a burden on the right to a jury
trial. Still, as one commentator on Maryland's statute noted, the
intrusion on this right is relatively insignificant. 14 5 The commen-
tators generally agree that the admissibility of a panel award does
not deny the right to jury trial.
46
The presumption of correctness ascribed to panel decisions is
not without merit. By discouraging further litigation of a claim, the
presumption may encourage settlement, thus effecting a savings in
legal, administrative, and court costs. In addition, assuming the im-
partiality of the panel, the award represents perhaps the most impar-
tial evidence that will be introduced at trial. Finally, if panels prove
to be effective and accurate in determining liability and damages,
their awards, even if rejected by one of the parties, may enhance the
quality of jury verdicts in subsequent proceedings.
Although one purpose of the statute is to protect plaintiffs from
exorbitant legal fees, the potential impact of permitting panels and
courts to review attorneys' fees 47 is less than certain. This statutory
provision is an obvious response to the criticisms by the medical pro-
fession and others of contingent fee arrangements.-4 Critics of the
145. Note, Medical Malpractice Arbitratior A Comparative Analysis 62 VA. L. REv. 1285
(1976), cited in Attorney General v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 292-93 n.17, 385 A.2d 57, 68
n.17, appeal dismissec 437 U.S. 117 (1978). The author described the rationale behind
allowing the award to be admitted at trials:
Admissibility is intended to discourage either party from failing to present a
complete case at arbitration in hopes of vindication at trial By encouraging
thorough presentation of the case at arbitration the provision promotes final
resolution of the claim in one stage (arbitration) rather than two (arbitration and
trial). Resolution in a single stage would permit the parties to realize the cost
savings attributable to arbitration. Such savings and the presumably fair results
in most cases will cause most parties to conclude that a jury trial is not desirable.
Only in the relatively rare case where there remains hope for a different verdict
at trial will the admissibility of the award affect the jury's role, and in those
cases the lawyer may be able to neutralize the effect of the award. Admissibility
of the award thus plays an important part in making the entire plan work and
results in only a relatively insignificant or possibly non-existent intrusion on the
domain of the jury.
62 VA. L. REV., supra, at 1303-04 n.110.
146. See, e.g., Lenore, Mandatory Medical Malpractice Mediation Panels - A Constitutional
Examination, 44 INS. COUNSEL J. 416, 422 (1977); Redish, supra note 92, at 793.
147. MD. 0S. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-07 (1980).
148. See SECRETARY'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 127, at 113-20.
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contingent fee system have frequently asserted, but never fully
documented, that contingent fees prompt overzealous attorneys to
accept non-meritorious cases and to magnify the nature of their
clients' injuries in order to win high awards from sympathetic juries.
The study by the Secretary of HEW's Commission of the contingent
fee refutes this claim-', 9 It also has been posited that the contingent
fee arrangement allows plaintiff lawyers to charge excessive fees.
The study, however, in a comparison of the effective hourly rate of
plaintiff lawyers ($63) with the average hourly rate of defense
lawyers ($50),11o indicates that, although a difference in rates exists,
it is not large enough to warrant the conclusion that plaintiff lawyers
are earning unconscionably large fees in malpractice cases. This
widespread misconception was found to be caused in part by the
extensive publicity given the occasionally large verdict or settlement
and the failure of many to realize that the contingent fee arrange-
ment enables a claimant to obtain legal counsel at little or no cost if
he loses the case and that the plaintiff attorney very often expends a
large amount of time and money on lost cases for which he recovers
no compensation."' 1
The Commission did find that the contingent fee system tends
to discourage the acceptance of legally meritorious malpractice cases
involving minor injury and relatively small potential recovery. 52 In
addition, the Commission found that after payment of hospital and
medical bills and attorneys' fees, successful claimants' net recoveries
were sometimes extremely low153 While the former problem may be
resolved best by encouraging members of the bar to take such cases
on a pro bono or slight fee-for-service basis, the latter problem may
best be corrected with legislation requiring a uniform graduated
scale of contingent fee rates in all malpractice litigation. The con-
tingent fee scale should be one in which the fee rate decreases as the
recovery amount increases, thus assuring the claimant the sub-
stantial portion of his recovery without depriving his attorney of
just compensation for his services. Even though the Maryland
statute assures some control over attorneys' fees in malpractice
cases, there is no guarantee that the application of this control will
be nearly as uniform or fair as a graduated scale of fee rates. Thus,
the arbitration panels and courts should heed the economic realities
of the contingent fee system and not act arbitrarily in regard to the
fees of plaintiff attorneys.
The statutory provision setting the time for filing an appro-
149. Id at 154. See generally id at 98-101.
150. Id at 115.
151. Id at 116.
152. Id at 117-18. On the other hand, the system does not encourage acceptance of non-meri-
torious claims with a large potential recovery.
153. See id at 154.
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priate third party claim may work an injustice on a defendant health
care provider. A third party claim must be filed within the fifteen
days provided in the Maryland Rules for filing a responsive
pleading. 54 This deadline for filing a response to the initial claim
would appear to preclude any later attempt by a health care provider
to implead another party. The requirement thus imposes a heavy
burden on the originally named health care provider and his attorney
to determine within a very short period of time the other individuals
or institutions who might share responsibility for the claimed med-
ical injuries.
Another disturbing aspect of the statute is its silence concerning
whether the panel must explain in writing the legal and factual bases
supporting its decision and award. Aside from impairing the ability
of a party to prove error, the statute's failure to require an explana-
tory opinion vests the panel with excessive power in two significant
respects. First, the panel may determine questions of liability and
damages without reference in a written decision to the rules of law
governing those matters. Second, if the panel does not apply the law
in an appropriate fashion, the lack of a published decision leaves no
basis for holding the panel accountable to either the losing party or
the public for its award.
155
A problem of discovery is also inherent in the new statute. An
action to nullify a panel award is governed by the Maryland Rules.1 56
Thus, there presumably could be a second round of discovery in the
same malpractice claim if a panel's award is rejected. If this addi-
tional discovery is not duplicative or otherwise unduly burdensome,
there would be no basis for objection. The Maryland Rules, however,
are not nearly as strict as the statute and regulations with regard to
discovery. Attorneys have substantially more latitude under the
rules to engage in costly and time-consuming tactics. Thus, prob-
lems may arise from the opportunity for post-award discovery in
malpractice cases which call for special limitation.
Although there has not yet been full opportunity for evaluation,
some predictions regarding the efficacy of the Maryland procedure
can be made by comparing the Health Claims Arbitration Act to the
most successful system studied by the HEW Commission. The arbi-
tration panel in Maryland is composed of an attorney, a health care
provider, and a citizen who is not a member of the legal or medical
profession. 11 7 The General Assembly apparently structured the arbi-
154. MD. CTs. & JUD. Poc. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-04(a) (1980); see MD. R.P. 308. Although the
court may extend the time period for filing a responsive pleading, see MD. R.P. 309, it is
not clear whether the statute vests the panel with similar discretion.
155. See Reynolds & Richman, The Non-Precedential Precedent - Limited Publication and
Non-Citation Rules in the United States Courts of Appeals, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1167
(1978).
156. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-06(b) (1980).
157. Id §§ 3-2A-03 to -04.
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tration panel with a concern for the appearance of fairness and for
the existence of expertise in discussions on liability and on compen-
sation to the negligently injured patient.15 In the federal commission
study, the device utilized for comparing the performance of courts
with screening panels was a decision ratio which reflected the per-
centage of decisions favorable to plaintiffs. 1 9 The Commission found
that screening panels generally find for the claimant in about the
same ratio as do courts.1 60 Of the various kinds of screening panels
studied,16 1 the federal commission found the so-called medical-legal
screening panel, which most closely resembles the Maryland panel in
composition, to have the highest potential for success.' 62 The deci-
sion-making of the medical-legal panel was not found to be unfairly
weighted or biased in favor of the physician.163 In terms of impact on
the docket loads of courts, this type of panel reduced claims by
approximately 24.5%, significantly more than panels of different
composition, and was determined to be among the least expensive to
operate. 16 4 While this evidence is far from conclusive insofar as the
Maryland arbitration panel is concerned, it furnishes some support
for believing that the new procedure is capable of providing a fair
and expeditious forum for the resolution of claims.
V. CONCLUSION
Many in Maryland believe there are serious functional and social
flaws in resolving medical malpractice disputes through the tradi-
tional tort system. The new arbitration procedure represents an
effort to improve upon the performance of the tort system by offer-
ing litigants a relatively quick, inexpensive, and equitable means of
resolving their disputes without depriving them of their day in court.
In this regard, the new system has the potential to accomplish sev-
eral results. By a rapid resolution of claims, the injured party will
158. One commentator has noted: "The presence of an attorney on the panel means that the
law of professional liability can be more accurately applied. The physician provides techni-
cal expertise, and the layperson serves as the panel's conscience - more or less the jury
,representative.' " Abraham, supra note 9, at 514.
159. SECRETARY'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 127, at 235, 245-53. One of the screening
panels in the study was being conducted by the Medical Chirurgical Faculty of Mary-
land. None of these screening programs were mandatory, nor did their decisions carry a
presumption of correctness in subsequent judicial proceedings. Despite the absence of
these features, the results obtained by the study furnish some guidance on the general
advantages and disadvantages of Maryland's arbitration panel.
160. Id at 246. Moreover, the decision ratios for plaintiffs were consistent with the perception
among both plaintiff and defense attorneys that about one-third of all malpractice claims
are meritorious. Id Unfortunately, a comparison of recovery amounts awarded by the
various systems was not made.
161. See id at 253-59.
162. Id at 276, 296.
163. Id at 296.
164. Id at 297.
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undergo a shorter waiting time for just compensation, the malprac-
tice insurer will be aided in planning with greater actuarial certainty
his undertaking to insure, and the falsely-accused health care pro-
viders will incur minimal embarrassment and damage to their repu-
tations. Because it is less expensive overall than the traditional tort
system, the arbitration procedure will effect a savings in court costs,
the insurance coverage of health care providers, and perhaps the
medical expenses of the consumer, without jeopardizing the damage
award of the bona fide claimant. Also, by eliminating many of the
drawbacks of the traditional tort system, the new procedure will pro-
vide a forum at least as equitable as the courts for claims resolution
while deterring frivolous and costly litigation.
To date, the new system has not had the opportunity to operate
under conditions in which its efficacy as an alternative to the tradi-
tional decisional process can be analyzed fairly. Until the problems
that currently plague its operation are eliminated, the system cannot
be subjected to fair and objective appraisal. Instead, Maryland's
Health Care Malpractice Claims Arbitration System will only con-
tinue to enhance the costs, delays, and inequities that it initially was
designed to remedy.
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